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The Charter versus the 
Government’s Crime Agenda 
Kent Roach* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the 25th anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms,1 I posed a “Charter reality check” and asked how relevant the 
Charter was to the justness of our criminal justice system. After examin-
ing rates of imprisonment, pre-trial detention, imprisonment of Aborigi-
nal people, crime victimization and wrongful convictions, I concluded 
that “Parliament deserves much of the credit or blame for the state of our 
criminal justice system”.2 Despite the important changes that the Charter 
has brought to the criminal justice system,3 the Charter played a minimal 
role in explaining why Canada did not move towards American-style 
reliance on imprisonment. What was in 2008 something of an academic 
exercise has taken on a new relevance and urgency in 2012, given the 
ability of the majority Conservative government to enact a dizzying array 
of new crime control measures. 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law and Prichard Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of 
Toronto. I thank Jamie Cameron, Jonathan Rudin and Sonia Lawrence for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Kent Roach, “A Charter Reality Check: How Relevant Is the Charter to the Justness of 
Our Criminal Justice System?” in J. Cameron & J. Stribopoulos, eds. (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 717, at 
719. 
3 Despite recent changes, the Court continues to enforce a quite robust constitutional ex-
clusionary rule. See R. v. Côté, [2011] S.C.J. No. 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215 (S.C.C.). The Charter has 
also abolished constructive murder and some restrictive defences, and may have prevented the re-
introduction of the death penalty: R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.). 
But for arguments that the Court has been less robust in constitutionalizing fault under the Charter 
than under the common law, see Kent Roach, “Mind the Gap: Canada’s Different Constitutional and 
Common Law Standards of Fault” (2011) 61 U.T.L.J. 545 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Mind the Gap’”]. 
On the death penalty, see United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
283 (S.C.C.). For arguments that the Court could have done more under the Charter to recognize the 
dangers of wrongful convictions, see Kent Roach, “The Protection of Innocence under Section 7 of 
the Charter” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 249. 
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In this paper, I will provide a preliminary assessment of the interac-
tion of the Charter and the government’s crime agenda. After the Court’s 
Insite decision requiring the Minister of Health to grant an exemption 
from drug laws to allow a safe injection site to operate,4 and to a lesser 
extent after an Ontario judge struck down a mandatory minimum 
sentence for a firearm offence,5 there has been talk about coming 
confrontations between the courts and the government over crime 
policy.6 I have no doubt that there will be some such conflicts in the 
coming years. I must, however, sound a note of caution about how much 
judges enforcing the Charter will restrain the government’s “tough on 
crime” policy. 
Many of the new laws shrewdly capitalize on the deference of courts 
to the exercise of prosecutorial and sentencing discretion. Although 
courts may intervene in egregious examples of misuse of such discretion, 
they will probably remain quite deferential with respect to most of the 
government’s initiatives. Even though most Charter litigation involves 
the criminal justice system, and many on both the right and the left have 
expressed concerns about the growth of judicial power in Canada, a 
majority government can still enact radical change in the justice system 
if it is smart enough to focus on empowering prosecutors and limiting the 
sentencing discretion of judges. 
The second part of this paper will examine the use of the Charter to 
challenge the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and in particular how 
the government’s crime agenda provides prosecutors with de facto 
sentencing power. It will suggest that the Charter will not effectively 
supervise the discretion of prosecutors to elect between prosecutions by 
summary conviction and by indictment, even though such decisions will 
be critical in determining what level of mandatory minimum sentences 
will apply and whether conditional sentences will be available. The third 
part of this paper will examine a variety of Charter arguments that can be 
used against new mandatory minimum sentences, including innovative 
new section 7 arguments that such penalties may be arbitrary and/or 
grossly disproportionate, and more traditional arguments that mandatory 
                                                                                                             
4 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”]. 
5 R. v. Smickle, [2012] O.J. No. 612, 2012 ONSC 602 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Smickle”]. 
6 Kirk Makin, “Landmark Insite decision threatens peace between judges and legislators” 
The Globe and Mail (October 10, 2011); Adrian Humphreys, “Tory gun laws in jeopardy after judge 
rejects ‘outrageous’ mandatory sentence” National Post (February 13, 2012). 
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sentences may impose disproportionate punishment for particular 
offenders who commit crimes in extenuating circumstances. 
II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
1. The Crown’s Discretion to Elect to Prosecute by Summary 
Conviction or Indictment 
One of the key provisions in the recently enacted Bill C-10 provides 
that conditional sentences will not be available where a number of 
offences, including theft over $5,000, motor vehicle theft, breaking and 
entering a place other than a dwelling house, and arson for a fraudulent 
purpose, are prosecuted by way of indictment.7 This follows the pattern 
of other laws that provide for mandatory minimum sentences or higher 
mandatory minimum sentences when hybrid offences are prosecuted by 
way of indictment as opposed to summary conviction.8 
The Crown’s discretion whether to prosecute by indictment or by 
summary conviction has long been accepted as a core element of 
prosecutorial discretion and it is difficult to review directly. Indeed, 
Canadian law under the Charter is not far removed from what it was 
when in 1971 the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a claim under the 
Canadian Bill of Rights9 by Conn Smythe, then President of the Toronto 
Maple Leafs. Mr. Smythe, represented by no less an advocate than J.J. 
Robinette, argued that the Crown’s election to prosecute income tax 
evasion by way of indictment as opposed to summary conviction violated 
equality before the law. Chief Justice Fauteux rejected this Bill of Rights 
claim, stressing that “[e]nforcement of the law and especially of the 
criminal law would be impossible unless someone in authority be vested 
with some measure of discretionary power.”10 
Judicial deference towards the exercise prosecutorial discretion per-
sists under the Charter. To be sure, there have some been changes, such 
as the recognition of the ability to bring malicious prosecution lawsuits 
                                                                                                             
7 Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, s. 34, amending s. 742.1 of the Crimi-
nal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
8 See, for example, Standing Up for Victims of White Collar Crime Act, S.C. 2011, c. 6 
with respect to certain fraud prosecutions, and Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6, s. 8 with 
respect to possession of a loaded weapon offence. 
9 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
10 R. v. Smythe, [1971] S.C.J. No. 62, [1971] S.C.R. 680, at 686 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Smythe”]. 
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against prosecutors11 and a recognition of the power of courts to stay 
proceedings in cases of abuse of process.12 These doctrines, however, 
have been interpreted quite restrictively and, in any event, only provide 
remedies against specific instances of proven misconduct. There is 
nothing in Charter jurisprudence that encourages courts to review the 
substantive fairness of new laws that effectively transfer sentencing 
discretion from judges to prosecutors. In R. v. Power,13 for example, the 
Court warned of the dangers of “second guessing” the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and cautioned that such review “would be 
conducive to a very inefficient administration of justice”, and that it 
might even threaten the impartiality of the courts as an arbiter between 
the Crown and the accused as adversaries. 
2. The Nixon Case 
This relatively deferential view of prosecutorial discretion was re-
cently re-affirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court in R. v. Nixon.14 The 
Court affirmed the right of an assistant deputy Attorney General to 
withdraw a plea agreement to careless driving with a joint sentence 
recommendation of an $1,800 fine in a car accident in which two people 
were killed and charges of impaired and dangerous driving causing death 
were laid. Justice Charron for the Court held that the decision to repudi-
ate the plea agreement was a matter of prosecutorial discretion and that 
the judge below had erred in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
exercise of the discretion. She stressed that by 
straying into the arena and second-guessing the decision, the reviewing 
court effectively becomes a supervising prosecutor and risks losing its 
independence and impartiality. Due regard to the constitutionally 
separate role of the Attorney General in the initiation and pursuit of 
criminal prosecutions puts such decisions “beyond the legitimate reach 
of the court” ... Thus, the court does not assess the reasonableness or 
correctness of the decision itself; it only looks behind the decision for 
“proof of the requisite prosecutorial misconduct, improper motive or 
bad faith in the approach, circumstances or ultimate decision to 
repudiate”.15 
                                                                                                             
11 R. v. Nelles, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.). 
12 R. v. Jewitt, [1985] S.C.J. No. 53, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
13 [1994] S.C.J. No. 29, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Power”]. 
14 [2011] S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nixon”]. 
15 Id., at para. 52. 
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The Court’s approach does not render the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion immune from Charter review. Indeed, the Court indicated that 
the repudiation of a plea agreement will satisfy the accused’s threshold 
burden on an abuse of process application, and as such will require the 
prosecutor to “explain why and how it made the decision not to honour 
the plea agreement”.16 At the same time, however, the accused will bear 
the ultimate burden of establishing an abuse of process that causes harm 
to a fair trial or judicial integrity that cannot be repaired without a stay. In 
other words, the accused will have to establish “prosecutorial miscon-
duct, improper motive or bad faith”.17 This burden was not satisfied in 
Nixon. Even if the accused can establish an abuse of process in future 
cases, any judicial intervention will be episodic and limited to the facts 
of the case. There will not be judicial regulation of how prosecutors 
exercise the increased power they will have when electing between 
different mandatory sentences, or when an election determines whether a 
conditional sentence is available. 
This approach to the judicial review of prosecutorial discretion will 
in almost all cases render the Crown’s discretion to prosecute offences 
by summary conviction or indictment resistant to judicial review. As 
recognized in Smythe, the Crown’s election is a routine and increasingly 
important part of the criminal justice system. Unlike the repudiation of a 
plea agreement, the Crown’s discretion to prosecute by indictment will 
not satisfy the threshold requirement that allows prosecutorial discretion 
to be reviewed on abuse of process grounds. This is true even though 
under recent legislation, the Crown’s decision to prosecute by way of 
indictment may preclude the option of a conditional sentence or produce 
a much higher minimum and maximum sentences than if the case were 
prosecuted by summary conviction. Given that the vast majority of 
accused plead or are found guilty, the Crown’s power to elect means that 
in many cases, the prosecutor becomes the de facto sentencing judge. 
3. The Importance of Crown Elections 
My point is not to suggest that courts should supervise Crown elec-
tions or to suggest that Crown elections are necessarily made for im-
proper or discriminatory purposes. There is no evidence that such is the 
case, and given the opaque nature of prosecutorial decision-making, 
                                                                                                             
16 Id., at para. 63. 
17 Id., at para. 68. 
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there is not likely to be evidence either way. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in 
Power18 even went out of her way to suggest that Crown prosecutors 
keep their reasons for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion confiden-
tial, something that makes judicial review even on limited abuse of 
process grounds very difficult.19 
It is possible that Crown elections to prosecute by summary convic-
tion may mitigate a significant amount of the potential impact of Bill 
C-10 and other parts of the government’s crime control agenda. Such 
mitigation could be defended on federalism grounds, as it allows prov-
inces such as Quebec that are uneasy with the government’s crime 
agenda to avoid some of its effects. It also means that provincial Crowns 
can adjust their election decisions when necessary to control rising prison 
populations. This all may be good, but my point is simply that the 
Charter will not restrain those crime control measures that give prosecu-
tors more powers based on their election of the mode of trial. The pre-
Charter precedent of Smythe remains good law on the matter of Crown 
elections even while Charter cases such as Nixon take pains to make the 
case that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not immune from 
Charter and abuse of process review. Judicial review may provide 
remedies in rare and egregious cases, but it will not constrain the 
enhanced role of prosecutors in sentencing decisions under many new 
crime laws, including Bill C-10. 
4. Arbitrary Gaps between Punishment on Summary Conviction 
and by Indictment 
In two recent cases, trial judges in Ontario have held that a two-year 
gap between the mandatory minimum sentence for a firearm offence 
when prosecuted by indictment and the maximum sentence available 
when the same offence is prosecuted by way of summary conviction 
violated section 7 of the Charter because no legitimate government 
purpose was served.20 These decisions confirm that the statutory context 
in which Crown prosecutors exercise the discretion whether to proceed 
by indictment or through summary conviction is subject to Charter 
review, including review on grounds of arbitrariness. They also confirm 
                                                                                                             
18 Supra, note 13. 
19 For my previous criticisms of this approach, see Kent Roach, “The Attorney General and 
the Charter Re-visited” (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 1. 
20 Smickle, supra, note 5; R. v. Nur, [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 2011 ONSC 4874 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
[hereinafter “Nur”]. 
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that utterly irrational criminal legislation is vulnerable to section 7 
invalidation on the grounds that it is arbitrary in relation to any legitimate 
governmental objective. Some might then conclude that courts will use 
arbitrariness and gross disproportionality review to control and invalidate 
much of the government’s crime agenda. 
The above conclusion would, however, be erroneous. The govern-
ment can easily cure the Charter defects discussed above simply by 
raising the maximum penalty when offences are prosecuted under the 
more efficient summary conviction procedure so that there is no longer 
any arbitrary gap. The maximum penalties for offences that are prose-
cuted by summary conviction, as with most offences, have been increas-
ing in any event. Such super summary convictions will be easier to 
process through the courts, as the accused will be unable to elect either a 
preliminary inquiry or trial by jury, and this, along with more frequent 
denial of bail, will put pressure on provincial prison populations. The 
recently enacted Bill C-10 carefully avoids arbitrary gaps by the expedi-
ent of raising maximum sentences in summary conviction offences to 18 
and even 24 months’ imprisonment. Such results confirm the pessimistic 
warning of critical criminologists such as Doreen McBarnet and the late 
Richard Ericson that due process can be used for crime control.21 
It will be suggested in the next part of this paper that section 7 re-
view for gross disproportionality and arbitrariness may often turn out to 
be a false start in Charter strategies to combat the government’s new 
crime agenda. These doctrines build in much deference to governments 
and to some extent they mimic the unsuccessful strategies of the Opposi-
tion in Parliament to defeat the government’s crime measures. Even if 
they are successful, as they were with respect to the arbitrary two-year 
gap in punishment found in Nur and Smickle, they may invite the 
government to respond, as it did in Bill C-10, by increasing maximum 
punishment for summary conviction offences. 
III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND SENTENCING DISCRETION 
The Safe Streets and Communities Act, also known as Bill C-10, en-
acts a broad range of mandatory sentences. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, accused can raise a range of Charter challenges to these 
sentences. The most traditional argument will be to argue that the 
                                                                                                             
21 Doreen McBarnet, Conviction (London: MacMillan, 1981); Richard Ericson, The Consti-
tution of Inequality (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1983). 
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mandatory sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary 
to section 12 of the Charter. As will be seen, however, such arguments 
face a number of challenges, including the Supreme Court’s deference 
towards mandatory sentences22 and the possibility that courts will require 
accused to demonstrate that the mandatory sentence is grossly dispropor-
tionate as applied to them rather than as applied to reasonable hypotheti-
cal offenders. Another challenge that accused will face under section 12 
of the Charter is that the highest new mandatory sentence in Bill C-10 is 
five years’ imprisonment for incest. Although it is easy to imagine a court 
striking down that sentence in a case involving truly consenting adults,23 
the Supreme Court in R. v. Morrisey24 upheld a mandatory four-year 
imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death. Many of Bill C-10’s 
new mandatory sentences are perhaps deliberately under four years in an 
order to “Charter proof” them or insulate them from review. 
In addition to section 12 challenges, the accused can challenge man-
datory sentences under section 7 of the Charter. A striking number of 
different section 7 challenges to mandatory sentences are possible, 
including arguments that mandatory sentences are arbitrary, that they 
produce costs that are grossly disproportionate to their benefits, and 
finally that they produce punishment that is disproportionate to the 
seriousness of particular crimes. These various strategies will be criti-
cally assessed below. 
1. Crown Elections and Reasonable Hypotheticals Used to Strike 
Down Mandatory Sentences 
The Supreme Court has so far only struck down one mandatory 
minimum sentence enacted by Parliament during the first 30 years of the 
Charter. In R. v. Smith25 the Court struck down a seven-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for importing narcotics, not on the basis that it was 
                                                                                                             
22 Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” 
(2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Searching for Smith’”]. 
23 Incest is a straight indictable crime. The Supreme Court has stressed that neither the 
consent nor age of the complainant is a factor in this crime: R. v. R. (G.), [2005] S.C.J. No. 45, 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.). It has been challenged but upheld under the Charter: R. v. S. (M.), 
[1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused 113 C.C.C. (3d) 
vii. There are other five-year mandatory minimums, but they apply to aggravated forms of sexual 
assault committed against children and can be avoided if the Crown elects to prosecute by summary 
conviction. 
24 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”]. 
25 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”]. 
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grossly disproportionate as applied to the particular accused, who 
imported seven-and-a-half ounces of cocaine, but on the basis that it 
would be unconstitutional if applied to a teenaged first-time offender 
who brought a joint of marijuana back to Canada after a spring vacation 
in Florida. The Court’s approach in the 1987 Smith decision reflected its 
enthusiasm for deciding Charter issues in the early years even if they 
were not squarely presented on the facts of the case.26 In subsequent 
years, the Court retreated from Smith and in R. v. Goltz27 and Morrisey28 
stressed that reasonable hypothetical offenders had to be common 
examples of offenders being sentenced in order to be used by the courts 
under section 12 in deciding whether a mandatory minimum sentence 
might have unconstitutional effects. The one post-Smith case that 
succeeded under section 12 involved a real and not a hypothetical 
offender.29 
Justice Code’s recent decision in Nur30 suggests that accused who 
seek to challenge most of the new mandatory minimum sentences may 
not even be able to use reasonable hypothetical analysis. In refusing to 
strike down a three-year mandatory minimum for a gun offence if 
prosecuted by indictment, Code J. observed that the ability to prosecute 
by way of summary conviction “is a complete answer to all of the 
‘reasonable hypotheticals’” under section 12 of the Charter.31 He stressed 
that section 12 Charter review of the mandatory sentence should assume 
that the Crown’s discretion to elect to proceed summarily or by indict-
ment is both an “essential feature of the criminal justice system” and one 
that will “be exercised in a fair and objective way”.32 At first blush, this 
conclusion seems at odds with both the established role that reasonable 
hypotheticals have played in the section 12 jurisprudence and the Court’s 
warning in Smith that it was not willing to rely on prosecutorial discre-
tion to avoid applying the seven-year penalty to a hypothetical young 
first offender. One difference, however, is that the offence examined in 
Smith was a straight indictable offence, whereas many of the new 
offences that carry mandatory sentences are hybrid offences. 
                                                                                                             
26 See Kent Roach, “Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing Reform and 
Policy” (1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433. 
27 [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.). 
28 Supra, note 24. 
29 Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (S.C.C.). 
30 Supra, note 20. 
31 Id., at para. 108. See also R. v. Kumar, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2266, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 417 
(B.C.C.A.) to similar effect. 
32 Nur, id., at para. 114. 
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Justice Code warned that reliance on prosecutorial discretion as a 
“safety valve” for mandatory sentences for hybrid offences “is not 
without risks or costs”. It could lead to the invalidation of mandatory 
sentences under section 52 in cases where the Crown fails to elect or re-
elect to the less severe summary conviction option and a sentence has 
cruel and unusual effects on a particular offender.33 The truth of this 
proposition is illustrated by the subsequent decision of Molloy J. in 
Smickle to strike down the three-year mandatory sentence in a case 
where she concluded that a one-year sentence was appropriate for a first 
offender prosecuted by way of indictment for the offence of possessing a 
loaded firearm. At the same time, it affirms that courts will in the vast 
majority of cases not directly review the Crown’s election, but rather the 
consequences of that election through the relatively deferential lens of 
section 12. 
Justice Code’s approach of assuming that the Crown will elect to 
proceed by summary conviction with respect to reasonable hypothetical 
offenders suggests that the higher mandatory sentences for indictable 
offences that have a summary conviction option will be immune from 
being struck down on the basis that they could have cruel and unusual 
effects as applied to reasonable hypothetical offenders. The American 
norm of “as applied” review to real offenders before the court will be 
required as it was in Smickle. Courts may well follow Code J. in assum-
ing that even common reasonable hypothetical offenders will benefit 
from more lenient mandatory sentences because they will be prosecuted 
by summary conviction. In other words, judicial assumptions about the 
proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion may contribute to judicial 
reluctance to strike down mandatory sentences because they may have 
cruel and unusual effects as applied to reasonable hypothetical offenders. 
We are a long way from Smith. 
2. The Importance of Morrisey 
The most relevant case to the government’s crime agenda is Mor-
risey,34 where the Court upheld a mandatory minimum sentence of four 
years for manslaughter committed with a handgun. The sentence in this 
case was part of 10 mandatory minimum sentences added to the Criminal 
Code by the Liberal government in 1995 gun control amendments. 
                                                                                                             
33 Id., at para. 117. 
34 Supra, note 24. 
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In Morrisey, the Court held that the four-year sentence was not cruel 
and unusual as applied to a 35-year-old first offender who resumed 
having alcohol problems after his relationship with the victim’s sister 
ended. The accused was suicidal and extremely intoxicated, and killed 
the victim, a friend of his, when a shotgun accidentally discharged while 
he was trying to get the victim’s attention. He attempted suicide after the 
killing, was very remorseful and pleaded guilty to criminal negligence 
causing death and unlawfully pointing a firearm. In many ways, it is 
difficult to conceive of a more sympathetic killer who would be caught 
by the new mandatory sentence. In a case where four Attorneys General 
intervened in support of the mandatory sentence and no one other than 
the accused opposed it, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
mandatory sentence. 
The Court in Morrisey continued the trend to restraining the use of 
hypothetical examples to measure the effects of mandatory sentences by 
warning that both hypotheticals and even real cases should only be 
considered if they were reasonable and common. Justice Gonthier 
stressed that the hypotheticals should “be common examples of the crime 
rather than examples of common occurrences in day-to-day life”35 and he 
even suggested that reported cases should be used with caution because 
the full facts may not be recorded. He discounted the trial judge’s finding 
that the killing was unintentional by stressing that “[i]n addition to 
causing death using a firearm, the Crown must establish that the accused 
acted in a manner that was a marked departure from the standard em-
ployed by a reasonable person. Their actions must be wanton or reckless, 
and deserving of criminal liability.”36 In this way, the Court took a formal 
and thin approach to the seriousness of the crime. It did not really 
explore how the accused’s drinking, suicidal tendencies, remorse and 
guilty plea may have mitigated the seriousness of his crime. As I have 
suggested elsewhere, the Court’s approach in this regard reflected a “just 
deserts” approach to sentencing that also saw the Court accept that the 
minimum sentence served retributive and denunciatory purposes even 
though such punishment might not be required for either specific 
deterrence or rehabilitation.37 As will be explored below, the Court’s 
recent decision in R. v. Ipeelee; R. v. Ladue38 reflects a thicker and more 
contextual understanding of proportionality. In that case, the Court is 
                                                                                                             
35 Id., at para. 33. 
36 Id., at para. 36. 
37 Id., at paras. 47-48, 53. See also Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 22. 
38 [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, 2012 SCC 13 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”]. 
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concerned not only with the formal definition and fault level of the 
offence, but with offender characteristics as they relate to prospects for 
specific deterrence, rehabilitation and public protection. The Court 
accepts that offender characteristics in some cases may mitigate a 
particular offender’s degree of moral blameworthiness for an offence, 
and thus affect what punishment is proportionate to the crime. 
The Court in Morrisey was not oblivious to the mitigating factors in 
the case, but viewed them through the lens of its abstract and formal 
discussion of the seriousness of the offence. Justice Gonthier concluded 
that he was 
not convinced that the mitigating factors offset the aggravating factors 
in this case. Nor am I convinced that the mitigating factors displace the 
gravity of the offence. The remorse demonstrated by the appellant is 
not at all surprising, given the nature of the offence. Nobody is alleging 
that the appellant intended to kill Mr. Teed; malice is neither alleged 
nor proven. In these circumstances, remorse is to be expected. The 
absence of a criminal record is also not surprising, given the nature of 
this offence. As the criminally negligent do not intend the results they 
cause, acts of criminal negligence are not generally committed as part 
of a pattern or a career of criminality.39 
If the fault of negligence was sufficient to justify the four-year penalty in 
Morrisey, then it may be difficult to overturn many of the new mandatory 
sentences in Bill C-10, which often require less than four years’ impris-
onment and also require subjective fault in relation to the crime. 
3. Smickle versus Stewart: How Deferential Will Judges Be to 
Mandatory Sentences? 
The above may be unduly pessimistic about the success of Charter 
challenges to new mandatory sentences. Justice Molloy of the Ontario 
Superior Court recently made headlines when she ruled that a mandatory 
minimum sentence of three years’ imprisonment for possession of a 
loaded handgun was unconstitutional. Justice Molloy went beyond the 
fact that Mr. Smickle knowingly possessed a loaded handgun in conclud-
ing that a one-year sentence of imprisonment was appropriate and that 
the two additional years required by Parliament were grossly dispropor-
tionate. She examined Mr. Smickle’s personal characteristics as an 
employed first-time offender with a fiancée and a young child, and 
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stressed that a three-year penitentiary sentence was not necessary to deter 
or rehabilitate him.40 
Justice Molloy also carefully considered whether the mandatory sen-
tence could be justified under section 1 of the Charter. She accepted that 
the mandatory sentence was rationally connected with the very important 
objective of deterring the use of firearms in crimes, but held that this 
could be done as effectively if Parliament used presumptive sentences 
subject to judicially justified and appealable exceptions, as is done in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa.41 She eloquently concluded that the 
offence 
is not a “one-size-fits-all” type of offence. Therefore, some flexibility is 
required to deal with those exceptional circumstances where the 
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence would run afoul of the 
Charter. The existing legislation is cast too broadly to prevent such 
abuse and does not meet the minimal impairment test provided for in 
Oakes.42 
She warned that the mandatory minimum sentence placed excessive 
pressure on the accused to plead guilty if possible to avoid the sentence, 
that it could contribute to prison overcrowding and that it could backfire 
in terms of rehabilitating by placing first-term offenders in a penitentiary 
environment.43 
The Crown in Smickle made the unexpected argument that the ap-
propriate remedy in the case was not to strike down the mandatory 
minimum sentence under section 52(1), but rather to order it under 
section 24(1) to prosecute the case by summary conviction. The Crown 
somewhat ironically relied on the Supreme Court’s Insite44 decision as a 
justification for such a mandatory remedy. Reflecting the type of judicial 
deference discussed in the first part of this paper in cases such as Smythe 
and Nixon, Molloy J. concluded that there was no evidence of abuse in 
                                                                                                             
40 Smickle, supra, note 5, at paras. 80-82. 
41 Justice Molloy concluded, id., at para. 113, that 
it is possible to impose a presumptive sentence for possession of a loaded weapon, while 
still preserving a judicial discretion to be exercised in those rare circumstances where the 
presumptive sentence would be grossly disproportionate given the circumstances of the 
offender and the offence. In every case where such a judicial discretion is exercised, there 
would be a right of appeal, thus providing supervision of the proper use of the discretion. 
This would still further the objectives of the legislation without breaching the s. 12 right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 
42 Id., at para. 117. 
43 Id., at para. 121. 
44 Supra, note 4.  
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the Crown’s election and that it would not be appropriate to order that the 
Crown elect to proceed by summary conviction.45 Following the Su-
preme Court’s decision in R. v. Ferguson,46 which held that the appropri-
ate response to unconstitutional mandatory sentences would be to strike 
them down in their entirety under section 52(1), Molloy J. then struck 
down the sentence for all offenders, holding that a suspended declaration 
of invalidity was not appropriate.47 As Benjamin Berger has suggested,48 
the Court’s use of the section 52 remedy may speed up dialogue and 
confrontation between courts and Parliaments. Indeed, the Smickle 
decision is being appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal and may 
eventually reach the Supreme Court of Canada. In general, the Crown 
will have more incentives to appeal the section 52 invalidation of 
mandatory sentences as opposed to the limited impact of the individual 
section 24(1) remedy that the Crown unsuccessfully urged on Molloy J. 
It may fight section 52(1) battles longer and harder than more limited 
section 24(1) cases.49 
The Smickle decision is bold and important, but it is not part of a 
tidal wave of court decisions invalidating mandatory minimum sen-
tences. In Nur,50 Code J. held that the same mandatory minimum 
sentence of three years’ imprisonment for possessing a loaded weapon 
would not be cruel and unusual given his finding that the young first-
time offender in that case deserved a sentence of two-and-a-half years’ 
imprisonment considering the aggravating and gang-related circum-
stances of the possession of the firearm. In the course of dismissing 
challenges to Crown discretion to seek mandatory sentences in drunk 
                                                                                                             
45 Justice Molloy concluded that “[t]here was nothing unconstitutional, or even improper, 
about the exercise of the Crown’s discretion and no basis for awarding a remedy based on the 
Crown’s conduct. It is the legislation itself that imposes the cruel and unusual punishment in this 
case, not anything that was done by the Crown Attorney.” Smickle, supra, note 5, at para. 139. She 
then added that 
in any event, mandamus requiring the Crown to exercise its discretion in a particular way 
is simply not a workable remedy here. That ship has sailed. The Crown has already exer-
cised its discretion to proceed by indictment. The trial is over. A conviction has been 
entered. It is too late now to do the whole thing over again as a summary conviction trial, 
even if I had jurisdiction to make such an order, which in my view I do not. 
Id., at para. 145. 
46 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.). 
47 Smickle, supra, note 5, at para. 151. 
48 Benjamin L. Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of Minimum Sentences, the 
Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 101. 
49 The Crown may be inclined to commission and present expert evidence in order to avoid 
invalidation of a mandatory sentence. 
50 Supra, note 20. 
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driving cases by serving notices of prior offences, Hill J. of the same 
Court stated: 
While mandatory minimum sentences have become increasingly more 
common, the decision to enact criminal law policy in this way is 
constitutionally assigned to Parliament. These type of sentences constitute 
the law of Canada and agreement or disagreement with the wisdom of 
such legislation is not a justiciable matter.51 
There was no direct challenge to the mandatory sentences in those cases, 
which for a second offence is 30 days and for subsequent offences is 90 
days.52 
Some trial judges who see the real-life effects of mandatory sen-
tences in their courtrooms on a regular basis may, as Molloy J. did, find 
that mandatory sentences are cruel and unusual punishment. Others with 
an eye on the Supreme Court’s precedents in this area and their Courts of 
Appeal may not. A troubling recent example is the Stewart case from 
British Columbia. Both the trial judge and the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal had little trouble applying a mandatory one-year sentence to 
April Ann Stewart, a 44-year-old woman in rural British Columbia with 
no prior convictions who supported two children. While in possession of 
a firearm, a 22-calibre rifle, she committed the indictable offence of 
being unlawfully in a dwelling house when she confronted and assaulted 
another woman with whom Stewart’s husband of 23 years was appar-
ently having an affair. Ms. Stewart was intoxicated at the time of the 
offences, did not point or fire the firearm, and left shortly after the 
confrontation. 
Both the trial judge and the British Columbia of Appeal dismissed 
Ms. Stewart’s constitutional challenge to the mandatory one-year 
sentence of committing an indictable offence with a firearm. The trial 
judge recognized the harmful effect that the one-year sentence would 
have on Ms. Stewart and her family, including two children who remained 
at home, but stressed that unlawfully being in a dwelling house was a 
serious offence and “given Ms. Stewart’s lack of a record and the avail-
ability of early release through parole and earned remission, I anticipate 
that she will be back with her family and community well before the end 
of any sentence I impose upon her”.53 The British Columbia Court of 
                                                                                                             
51 R. v. Mohla; R. v. Singh, [2012] O.J. No. 388, 2012 ONSC 30, at para. 134 (Ont. S.C.J.), 
reconsideration allowed [2012] O.J. No. 799, 2012 ONSC 1210 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
52 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 255. 
53 R. v. Stewart, [2008] B.C.J. No. 259, 2008 BCSC 1741, at para. 41 (B.C.S.C.). 
226 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Appeal unanimously dismissed the accused’s appeal. Justice Frankel 
concluded, “it is beyond question that Parliament can require mandatory 
punishments to be imposed unless it can be shown that a particular 
punishment violates s. 12 of the Charter”. He then ruled that considering 
all the circumstances, “including the deference owed to Parliament, I am 
unable to conclude that Ms. Stewart has established that the one-year 
sentence imposed on her is grossly disproportionate”.54 For every Smickle 
there may be more cases like Stewart. Those who challenge many of the 
government’s new mandatory sentences under the Charter will face an 
uphill battle, especially to the extent that the Crown relies on precedents 
such as Morrisey. 
4. Reading the Tea Leaves about the Supreme Court’s Approach to 
Mandatory Sentences 
It remains to be seen what stance the Supreme Court will take when 
it reconsiders mandatory sentences, perhaps in Smickle. As suggested 
above, its decision in Morrisey suggests that it may be quick to defer to 
mandatory sentences. The Court may acknowledge that mandatory 
sentences are controversial, but stress that the choice of criminal justice 
policy is up to Parliament. The Court took this approach in R. v. Latimer 
when it stated: “The choice is Parliament’s on the use of minimum 
sentences, though considerable difference of opinion continues on the 
wisdom of employing minimum sentences from a criminal law policy or 
penological point of view.”55 In my view, such an approach would be 
unfortunate because it avoids the reality that only courts are in a position 
to see the actual effects of mandatory penalties on real offenders such as 
Mr. Smickle and Ms. Stewart. Our trial judges should be prepared to 
sound an alarm when mandatory sentences force them to do an injustice. 
Justice Molloy’s section 1 analysis in Smickle also suggests that 
courts can accept the deterrent and denunciatory objectives of mandatory 
sentences as legitimate, yet still ask the hard question of whether these 
objectives could be pursued in other ways that infringe rights less. 
Indeed, even if the government candidly argues that one of the objectives 
of mandatory sentences is to curtail judicial discretion and the court 
                                                                                                             
54 R. v. Stewart, [2010] B.C.J. No. 528, 2010 BCCA 153, at paras. 38, 41 (B.C.C.A.). 
55 [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 88 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Latimer”]. The 
author represented the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, which argued that the penalty was 
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Latimer. 
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accepted such an objective as sufficiently important to limit Charter 
rights, it could still point out the less rights-invasive option of sentencing 
guidelines. Both with respect to the effects of mandatory sentences on 
real offenders and with respect to less drastic policy measures, courts 
have important points to make in a dialogue with Parliament about 
mandatory sentences. 
5. R. v. Topp 
The Supreme Court has recently decided two cases which, while not 
directly dealing with mandatory sentences, may be of some relevance in 
how the Court will approach such issues. In R. v. Topp,56 the Court 
affirmed that section 734(2) of the Criminal Code imposes a burden on a 
party seeking a fine to establish to the court that the offender has the 
ability to pay the fine. The case involved a Crown appeal after a trial 
judge refused to impose a $4.7 million fine on an offender found guilty 
of defrauding customs of the same amount. The Court refused to hold 
that a judge was bound by law to infer that those involved in economic 
crimes still had the necessary funds to pay a fine. The Court noted that 
section 734(2) was remedial legislation enacted in 1995 to respond to 
evidence that a large number of offenders were being imprisoned for 
failure to pay a fine. The decision is difficult to criticize, but it reveals 
dilemmas in the sentencing of impoverished offenders. Parliament’s 
progressive remedy in 1995 may in today’s environment of restrictions 
on conditional sentences push judges towards using imprisonment. 
Under the recently enacted Bill C-10, conditional sentences would 
no longer be available for either fraud or theft over $5,000. Although it is 
possible that a judge might still order probation for such offences, such 
an approach would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision 
that conditional sentences are a more severe sanction than probation.57 In 
any event, Mr. Topp would now be subject to a mandatory minimum 
penalty of two years’ imprisonment under the Standing Up for Victims of 
White Collar Crime Act58 because he was convicted of a fraud of over $1 
million. Such legislation may be politically popular given understandable 
outrage over economic crimes. Like other forms of punitive forms of 
                                                                                                             
56 [2011] S.C.J. No. 43, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 119 (S.C.C.). 
57 R. v. Proulx, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.). 
58 S.C. 2011, c. 6, s. 2. 
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victims’ rights,59 however, sentencing Mr. Topp to a two-year term in a 
federal penitentiary may pose something of a false promise to victims of 
white-collar crimes despite its promising title. The Standing Up for 
Victims of White Collar Crime Act requires a court to consider a restitu-
tion order, but courts will be reluctant to make such orders if the offender 
does not have the ability to pay. Offenders will be less likely to have the 
ability to pay if they are imprisoned. Part of the Safe Streets and Com-
munities Act60 is designed to assist victims of crime, namely, victims of 
terrorism, by allowing them to sue selected foreign states who sponsored 
terrorism. In both cases, however, the remedies are self-help remedies 
that will only benefit a small minority of crime victims fortunate enough 
to be eligible. Such punitive and neo-liberal mechanisms are no substi-
tute for more generous victim compensation that should be available for 
all crime victims, not just the most visible or politically popular ones. 
6. R. v. Ipeelee; R. v. Ladue 
Another recent decision that may be of relevance to the Court’s 
approach to mandatory sentence is Ipeelee61concerning the sentencing of 
Aboriginal offenders. In both cases, the Court indicated that trial judges 
had erred in imposing sentences of three years’ imprisonment for 
violating non-intoxicant requirements in long-term offender designations. 
The case is important with respect to the Court’s reinforcement of the 
mandatory duty on trial judges under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal 
Code to consider the particular circumstances of Aboriginal offenders in 
light of the discriminatory and colonial treatment of Aboriginal people in 
Canada, and the growing and gross over-representation of Aboriginal 
people in jail.62 The case is also important for the Court’s holding that 
even a long-term offender designation involves concern for rehabilitation 
as a means of achieving public safety. My focus here, however, will be 
                                                                                                             
59 The concept of punitive victims’ rights being used as a new form of crime control that 
gives police and prosecutors more power, without giving victims more power or even compensation, 
is described in Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics of 
Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
60 S.C. 2012, c. 1, Part I. 
61 Supra, note 38. The author represented the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 
which intervened in Ladue and which opposed the three-year sentence. For a fuller discussion of this 
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Decision in R. v. Ipeelee”, in B.L. Berger & J. Stribopoulos, eds. (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 375. 
62 See Jonathan Rudin, id. 
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more limited. What does Ipeelee portend for the constitutionality of 
mandatory sentences? 
Although the case was presented in the media as a case solely about 
Aboriginal offenders and so-called discounts for Aboriginal offenders,63 
the Court in Ipeelee had much to say about proportionality between 
crimes and penalties, an issue that will be central to Charter challenges to 
mandatory sentences. Justice LeBel stated: 
The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is 
intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — the main-
tenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of 
just sanctions. Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the 
various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting 
sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality. 
Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle 
ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is 
closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for 
victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system. ... Second, 
the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed 
what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. 
In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and 
ensures justice for the offender. In the Canadian criminal justice system, 
a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality 
and does not elevate one at the expense of the other.64 
Justice LeBel noted that proportionality was rooted in the justice system 
well before it was recognized as the fundamental principle of sentencing 
in 1996, when section 718.1 of the Criminal Code was enacted. He 
added that proportionality 
also has a constitutional dimension, in that s. 12 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms forbids the imposition of a grossly 
disproportionate sentence that would outrage society’s standards of 
decency. In a similar vein, proportionality in sentencing could aptly be 
described as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.65 
The approach to proportionality between crime and punishment in 
Ipeelee suggests that the Court may take a thicker and more contextual 
approach than previously taken in Morrisey. As discussed above, the 
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64 Supra, note 38, at para. 37. 
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Court in Morrisey focused on the mens rea requirement of criminal 
negligence causing death when judging the seriousness of that crime.66 
Mitigating factors such as the facts that the offender was a first-time 
offender, was intoxicated and was remorseful did not cause the Court to 
determine that the mandatory sentence of four years’ imprisonment 
was grossly disproportionate. In contrast, LeBel J. in Ipeelee integrates 
offender characteristics and mitigating factors into his discussion of 
proportionality. He stresses that proportionality must not only denounce 
crimes and reflect concerns for victims, but also ensure justice for the 
offender.67 In the context of Aboriginal offenders, this approach requires 
judicial notice of systemic factors, as well as Gladue reports that will 
explore the background circumstances that bring the offender before the 
court and the options available in the community for achieving all the 
purposes of sentencing. To the extent that the circumstances of Aborigi-
nal offenders as persons are integrated into the discussion of proportion-
ality in Ipeelee, the Court may be returning to a more contextual approach 
to proportionality that characterized Smith,68 where the Court held that a 
seven-year sentence would be cruel and unusual as applied to a teenaged 
first-time offender bringing a small amount of marijuana across the 
border. The Court in Smith held that the mandatory penalty was grossly 
disproportionate not simply in relationship to the seriousness of the 
importing offence as measured by its requirement of subjective fault, but 
also because it was not necessary to deter or rehabilitate the particular 
offender and because of its severe effects on a first-time and young 
offender. 
Justice Lamer in Smith also stressed that the mandatory sentence 
cannot be salvaged by relying on the discretion of the prosecution not 
to apply the law in those cases where, in the opinion of the prosecution, 
its application would be a violation of the Charter. To do so would be 
to disregard totally s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides 
that any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force 
or effect to the extent of the inconsistency and the courts are duty 
bound to make that pronouncement, not to delegate the avoidance of a 
violation to the prosecution or to anyone else for that matter.69 
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He also accepted that the mandatory sentence was rationally connected to 
the important objective of deterring and punishing the importation of 
illegal drugs, but held that the 
net cast ... for sentencing purposes need not be so wide as that cast ... 
for conviction purposes. The result sought could be achieved by limiting 
the imposition of a minimum sentence to the importing of certain 
quantities, to certain specific narcotics of the schedule, to repeat offenders, 
or even to a combination of these factors.70 
It remains to be seen whether in the section 12 context, the Court 
will embrace the more contextual and offender-sensitive vision of propor-
tionality in Ipeelee, or whether it will be drawn back to the approach in 
Morrisey which focuses more on the abstract seriousness of the offence. 
In my view, the Court should take a more generous approach that 
incorporates a range of offender characteristics and mitigating factors 
that Parliament cannot possibly imagine when it enacts a mandatory 
sentence. To be sure, such an approach will be greeted by critics on both 
the right and the left with their well-rehearsed charges of judicial 
activism and interference with legislative policy. The Court should not be 
swayed by such criticisms, especially at the level of interpreting the 
relevant Charter right. The government will have its day in court, so to 
speak, in justifying the law under section 1. 
7. Is Proportionality between Crime and Punishment a New 
Principle of Fundamental Justice? 
It is commonplace that the state of the principles of fundamental 
justice under section 7 is complex and for many confusing.71 In the 
recent Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General)72 case, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal applied three different principles of fundamental justice: (1) a 
requirement that a law not be arbitrary to its ends; (2) a requirement that 
it not be overbroad to its objectives; and (3) a requirement that there be 
no gross disproportionality between the effects of a law in achieving the 
government’s objective and its impact on rights. The Supreme Court in 
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the Insite case73 recognized, but did not resolve, disagreements within the 
Court on determining whether a law was arbitrary. 
Justice LeBel in Ipeelee may have introduced yet another principle 
of fundamental justice into the mix when he stated that “proportionality 
in sentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamental 
justice under s. 7 of the Charter”.74 The Court’s casual75 recognition of 
proportionality between crime and punishment as a principle of funda-
mental justice is surprising given its findings in R. v. Malmo-Levine: 
To find that gross and excessive disproportionality of punishment is 
required under s. 12 but a lesser degree of proportionality suffices 
under s. 7 would render incoherent the scheme of interconnected 
“legal rights” set out in sections 7 to 14 of the Charter by attributing 
contradictory standards to sections 12 and 7 in relation to the same 
subject matter. Such a result, in our view, would be unacceptable.76 
Nevertheless, there is a strong case that proportionality between crime 
and punishment satisfies the three-part test for a principle of fundamental 
justice. It is a legal principle that was recognized by Parliament in 1996 
as the fundamental principle of sentencing and, although there are 
different versions of proportionality, it can be defined with precision.77 It 
is also possible that courts might be bolder in applying a separate section 
7 principle of proportionality between a crime and a sentence. In particu-
lar, given the social consensus on proportionality, it might not require 
that a sentence shock the public conscience or public decency before it 
qualifies as a disproportionate sentence. 
Justice LeBel’s reference to proportionality between crime and pun-
ishment as a principle of fundamental justice may open a door that the 
Court closed in Malmo-Levine78 and allow a two-pronged approach when 
challenging mandatory penalties. The first would be gross disproportion-
ality between the crime and punishment review under section 12 of the 
Charter. As suggested above, the Court has since Smith79 been quite 
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deferential to Parliament in this review. In Morrisey,80 the Court took an 
abstract approach to offence seriousness and in Latimer,81 the Court 
stressed deference to Parliament’s decision to elevate some sentencing 
purposes over others when enacting mandatory sentences. The Court has 
also suggested that only commonly occurring reasonable hypotheticals 
should be used, and Code J.’s decision in Nur82 suggests that even 
common hypotheticals may not be considered if the Crown can avoid 
imposing a mandatory sentence by electing to proceed by way of 
summary conviction. A separate section 7 approach might avoid some of 
these restraints. 
8. Templates for a Section 7 Requirement of Proportionality 
between Crime and Punishment 
There are also some templates for a section 7 approach to propor-
tionality between crime and punishment. The first is Wilson J.’s concur-
rence in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2),83 
where she held that an absolute liability offence violated section 7 of the 
Charter because it resulted in a mandatory seven days’ imprisonment that 
was disproportionate to the offence. Although she conceded that propor-
tionality between punishment and crime cannot be determined “with 
mathematical precision”, Wilson J. concluded that a fit proportion 
between crime and punishment was a principle of fundamental justice 
traditionally used by trial judges in the exercise of their sentencing 
discretion. In contrast to the narrow and formal approach taken in 
Morrisey, Wilson J. stressed the need to consider “many different factors” 
in determining the seriousness of the offence. In this way, she recognized 
both the breadth of many offences and the relevance of the different 
circumstances under which offences could be committed. She concluded 
that seven days’ imprisonment for an absolute liability offence was 
“grossly excessive and inhumane. It is not required to reduce the inci-
dence of the offence. It is beyond anything required to satisfy the need 
for ‘atonement’.”84 
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Justice Arbour in her dissent in Malmo-Levine85 also stressed that the 
fit between a crime and its punishment should be assessed under section 
7 as well as under section 12 of the Charter. She stressed the possibility 
of imprisonment for the offence of marijuana possession and was less 
convinced than the majority that the existence of sentencing discretion 
would prevent the use of imprisonment for marijuana possession. Both of 
these approaches are promising because they focus on whether manda-
tory penalties are arbitrary and unjust in particular cases. They suggest 
that mandatory penalties, even of a week or more in prison, may still be 
arbitrary and disproportionate when applied in particular cases, and even 
if they are not so excessive as to shock public conscience or decency. 
Both of these templates provide a starting point for thinking about a 
section 7 requirement of proportionality between crime and punishment 
that could be distinct and perhaps less demanding than the section 12 
standard, which seems to require high levels of punishment that are 
shocking to a public that seems to be in a more fearful, mean and 
punitive mood. 
9. Arbitrariness and Gross Disproportionality: Should the Focus 
Be on Individual Offenders or Broader Legislative Objectives? 
Allan Manson draws on references to arbitrariness in B.C. Motor 
Vehicles to call for re-invigorated judicial review of mandatory sentences 
to focus on what he calls “arbitrary disproportionality”.86 Debra Parkes 
makes a somewhat similar argument.87 Professors Manson and Parkes 
cite in support the section 7 jurisprudence on arbitrariness in Chaoulli v. 
Quebec (Attorney General)88 and in the Insite case89 as support for a 
more robust approach to Charter review of mandatory sentences. I share 
the desires of both of my colleagues for more robust Charter review of 
mandatory sentences, but I am not enthusiastic about relying on Chaoulli 
and Insite. These section 7 cases speak to the relation between legislative 
objectives and impugned measures. Courts may well find that mandatory 
sentences are not arbitrary in relation to Parliament’s objective of deterring 
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and punishing crime. Mandatory sentences are an attempt to increase the 
certainty and severity of punishment, two central elements of deterrence. 
In this sense, mandatory sentences may rarely be arbitrary to Parlia-
ment’s purposes, especially with respect to crimes that are more serious 
than driving with a suspended licence or possession of marijuana. In 
section 1 language, there may often be a rational connection between the 
legislative objective of punishment and deterrence, and the mandatory 
sentence. 
In my view, the real mischief of mandatory sentences is not so much 
in their macro relation to legislative purposes, but in their micro applica-
tion to individual offenders. In exceptional cases, the imposition of a 
mandatory sentence on a particular offender may be arbitrary and not 
rationally connected to the aims of punishment, but only in that and 
similar cases. In many respects, the appropriate judicial remedy would be 
a constitutional exemption, but it appears after Ferguson90 that such a 
tailored remedy will not be available. Although cases such as Latimer91 
and Ferguson may direct courts to these larger policy questions, there is 
in my view a need to keep judges focused on the harmful effects that 
mandatory sentences will impose on particular offenders. It will be easier 
to focus on the individual offender under more traditional understandings 
of proportionality that examine the fit between punishment and particular 
crimes and offenders, than under more novel concepts of arbitrariness 
and gross disproportionality that focus on legislative objectives. In these 
difficult times, courts should stick to their traditional strengths.92 
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In an interesting extra-judicial speech, Justice Fish contrasted utili-
tarian and retributive approaches to sentencing and suggested that the 
principle of proportionality resides in the latter tradition. He took note of 
the increasing use of mandatory sentences in Canada and suggested that 
Canadian judges are obliged by law to impose the stipulated minimum 
custodial terms of imprisonment even when they consider it unjust to 
do in view of the particular circumstances of the offence or the 
offender. In such instances, the sentence commanded by the specific 
provision of the law is plainly inconsistent with the principle of 
proportionality ... .93 
These statements suggest that judges may believe that they are on firmer 
grounds in declaring that Parliament has unconstitutionally authorized 
disproportionate punishment for particular offenders who commit crimes 
in particular circumstances than in evaluating and appearing to second-
guess the utilitarian value of mandatory sentences. It is also significant 
that Justice Fish, in line with the Court’s 1987 decision in Smith and its 
subsequent decision in Ipeelee, described proportionality as a matter that 
focuses not simply on the crime, but also on the offender and the particu-
lar circumstances under which the offence was committed. 
The broader policy analysis of whether mandatory sentences are ar-
bitrary or grossly disproportionate to legislative objectives contemplated 
in Malmo-Levine, Chaoulli and Insite may only invite judicial deference. 
Courts may well hold that Parliament is entitled at a macro level to 
assume that mandatory sentences will fulfil legislative objectives and to 
decide to stress certain objectives such as deterrence over others such as 
rehabilitation and restraint. Even if they are successful, rulings that 
mandatory sentences are arbitrary or grossly disproportionate may only 
invite replies that simply re-assert that such mandatory sentences achieve 
broader legislative objectives and the commissioning of research de-
signed to demonstrate such results. It will be suggested below that such 
broader policy analysis of the effectiveness and necessity of mandatory 
sentences should be restricted to section 1, where the government bears 
the burden of justification. 
Although a full examination of gross disproportionality review is 
beyond the scope of this paper, I have doubts that gross disproportional-
ity or arbitrariness review will nullify much of the government’s crime 
agenda. The Insite case should be read carefully because the Court was 
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evaluating the gross disproportionality not of a law itself, but only of the 
Minister’s denial of an exemption to a particular safe injection site in 
Vancouver. The decision was actually more limited than those of the 
courts below, which addressed the constitutionality of the drug laws.94 
The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford95 also demon-
strates much caution in applying the new section 7 doctrines. It specifi-
cally warned about the dangers of underestimating the benefits of 
criminal law and the need for the harms of criminal law clearly to 
outweigh the benefits to justify a court striking the law down.96 In some 
respects, gross disproportionality analysis seems to mimic the attempts 
by the parliamentary opposition to argue that the costs of mandatory 
sentences outweigh their benefits. 
Gross disproportionality analysis may work in some cases such as 
Bedford where there may be extensive social science to call on in 
measuring the effects of criminal law, but it may be less useful in 
evaluating the deterrent effect of drug and other laws, given the difficul-
ties of evaluating the effectiveness of such laws.97 Indeed, the costs of 
Bill C-10 have been a moving target. They have ranged from the 
government’s prediction of $78 million to much higher estimates, and 
the parliamentary budget officer has encountered difficulties in costing 
the law.98 The costs of Bill C-10 remain quite unclear despite the fact 
that the 2011 election was fought in part on the basis of the government’s 
refusal to reveal the costs of its crime control initiatives. The effective-
ness of Bill C-10 will be even more difficult to measure. Those who wish 
to challenge its mandatory sentences may be better advised to focus on 
its disproportionate effects on particular offenders rather than attempting 
to prove that the sentences are arbitrary or grossly disproportionate to its 
legislative objectives. 
Gross disproportionality and arbitrariness review may often boil 
down to trials by social science experts. Although Charter applicants 
succeeded in both Insite and Bedford, the government has the deeper 
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pockets when it comes to hiring and commissioning experts. If the 
government loses a case on arbitrariness and gross disproportionality, 
such as the arbitrary gap in punishment found in Nur and Smickle, it may 
respond simply by increasing punishment or devoting more resources to 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the measure. In contrast, a finding 
that a mandatory sentence is unconstitutional because of its effects on 
exceptional offenders may force the government to provide judges with 
the discretion to depart from the sentence in exceptional cases. Alterna-
tively, it may force the government to reaffirm mandatory sentences by 
using the override under section 33.99 
Without dismissing gross disproportionality review entirely, I am 
more optimistic about traditional arguments that mandatory sentences 
will result in punishment that is grossly disproportionate to particular 
crimes committed by particular offenders. Evaluating the proportionality 
between the crime and the punishment is within the traditional domain 
and expertise of the courts.100 Evaluating the degree to which mandatory 
sentences fulfil legislative objectives and balancing the social benefits 
against the social costs of laws is not within the judiciary’s traditional 
domain of expertise, at least outside the section 1 context. 
Courts do not need expert evidence to measure the proportionality of 
punishment imposed by Parliament against particular crimes committed 
by particular offenders. Trial judges are in an excellent position to see the 
nuances of offending behaviour, the tragic backgrounds of some offend-
ers and the devastating harms that mandatory sentences will have on 
particular offenders and their families. The concrete adjudicative facts 
found by trial judges in cases like Smickle may be more compelling than 
speculative legislative facts based on the testimony of criminologists, 
political scientists, philosophers and economists about the government’s 
legitimate objectives of deterring and punishing serious crimes and the 
social costs and benefits of such measures. That said, the courts’ con-
cerns about invalidating mandatory sentences under Ferguson, as well as 
the need to determine whether even unconstitutional mandatory sen-
tences can be justified, may well force the accused to join the broader 
policy issues about the effectiveness of mandatory sentences. In my 
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view, the best place for the accused to fight such a battle is under section 
1, where the government with all its superior resources bears the burden 
of justification. 
10. Engaging the Government’s Crime Agenda under Section 1: 
Who’s Afraid of Section 1? 
Justice Molloy’s section 1 analysis in Smickle suggests that courts 
could respectfully engage with Parliament about the merits of mandatory 
minimum sentences. In Smickle, Molloy J. accepted that the govern-
ment’s objective of controlling gun violence was important enough to 
justify the limitation of Charter rights. She noted that no evidence was 
presented to establish the rational connection between this objective and 
the mandatory sentence, but she was prepared to assume that there was a 
rational connection. Justice Molloy then concluded that the mandatory 
sentence did not violate the Charter as little as possible because 
it is possible to impose a presumptive sentence for possession of a 
loaded weapon, while still preserving a judicial discretion to be exercised 
in those rare circumstances where the presumptive sentence would be 
grossly disproportionate given the circumstances of the offender and 
the offence.101 
She added that any judicial departures from the presumptive sentence 
could be appealed and that the presumptive sentence approach was 
consistent with approaches used in the United Kingdom and South 
Africa. 
Moving to the last stage of the section 1 test, Molloy J. noted that 
while “every reasonable person would support reducing violent crime 
and protecting the public”,102 there was no evidence that mandatory 
sentences were an effective deterrent. Justice Molloy then balanced the 
objectives of the law against its harmful effects, not only with respect to 
the violation of sections 7 and 12 but also with respect to 
(1) the sentence inflation for persons who, although not deserving a 
sentence of less than a one year sentence, must now receive at least 
three years; (2) the danger of increased recidivism by incarcerating 
youthful first offenders for extended periods of time with hardened 
criminals; (3) contributing to the over-crowded conditions in our 
correctional facilities; (4) the systemic disincentive for guilty pleas and 
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early resolutions if the minimum sentence will be three years in prison 
for any offender charged with the indictable offence; and, (5) as the 
Supreme Court noted in Smith, the unfair advantage given to the Crown 
as an accused will be under pressure to plead guilty to a lesser included 
offence in order to avoid the risk of the mandatory minimum.103 
The section 1 analysis in Smickle suggests that there could be a genuine 
dialogue between courts and legislatures over crime control measures. In 
this dialogue, courts can defer to legislative crime control objectives 
while at the same time objectively assessing whether such objectives 
could be fulfilled by less drastic measures, such as the use of presump-
tive as opposed to mandatory sentences. 
The dialogue that occurred between the Court and Parliament in 
Smickle might, however, seem weighted in the direction of rejecting the 
government’s attempt to justify mandatory sentences, given that Molloy 
J. prefaced the section 1 analysis by doubting that violations of sections 7 
and 12 could ever be justified under section 1.104 The Ontario Court of 
Appeal similarly observed in Bedford that “[w]hile non-compliance with 
s. 7 can theoretically be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, in reality s. 1 
will rarely, if ever, trump a s. 7 infringement.”105 Both courts accurately 
reflected Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has never held that a 
violation of section 7 (or of section 12) is justified under section 1.106 
In my view, there is no need to place such a thumb on the section 1 
balancing scales. 
Section 1 is the real focus of dialogue or interaction between courts 
and legislatures.107 The reluctance of the Supreme Court to hold that 
violations of either section 7 or section 12 of the Charter can ever be 
justified under section 1 of the Charter has arguably made the Court less 
generous when interpreting those rights because of the difficulty of 
governments justifying exceptions to those rights.108 Indeed, it is possible 
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to argue that all mandatory penalties should infringe section 7 or section 
12 on separation of powers grounds alone as infringing the right of 
judges to determine fit sentences, while also conceding that particular 
mandatory sentences might be justified by the government under section 1. 
Courts should evaluate mandatory sentences straight up. In many 
cases, they may conclude, as the Court did in Smickle, that there are less 
drastic alternatives and that the effects of the mandatory sentences on 
offenders outweigh their often uncertain benefits in advancing the 
government’s objectives, but there may be some cases where mandatory 
sentences can be justified. Such a dialogue should be conducted under 
section 1, where the government with its superior resources will have the 
burden of justification and uncertainties will be resolved against the 
government rather than through an interpretation of section 7 or section 
12 of the Charter. Accused who seek to challenge mandatory sentences as 
arbitrary or grossly disproportionate will have to prove that the govern-
ment has been irrational, whereas the government will have to justify 
mandatory sentences as rational and necessary governmental policy 
under section 1. 
An open and full section 1 analysis may also allow the Court to 
speak more directly to the government and its supporters about their 
strongly held concerns about crime. As Molloy J.’s approach in 
Smickle109 demonstrates, courts can cheerfully accept the legitimacy of 
the government’s crime control objectives and even its objective in 
controlling judicial sentencing discretion, but still conclude that manda-
tory sentences are not necessary. A full section 1 analysis was conducted 
in many landmark section 7 cases, including R. v. Vaillancourt,110 R. v. 
Martineau111 and R. v. Charkaoui,112 and the judicial decisions were the 
better for it. In many cases, there will be a range of less rights-invasive 
means to pursue the various objectives in the government’s crime 
agenda. Even in cases where there may be no reasonable alternatives, the 
harms of the new laws to Charter rights and particular offenders will 
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often be great and certain compared to the uncertain social benefits of 
mandatory sentences. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Safe Streets and Communities Act relies on prosecutorial discre-
tion and a general judicial reluctance to strike down mandatory sen-
tences. The government has shrewdly capitalized on those areas of the 
law that will make it difficult for the accused to convince courts to strike 
down laws under the Charter. This is not to say that Charter challenges 
are impossible, only that they will be difficult. In particular, the use of 
reasonable hypothetical in section 12 analysis may be precluded by 
reliance on the assumption that longer mandatory sentences will not be 
applied because the Crown has the power to avoid such sentences by 
electing to prosecute the relevant crime by way of summary conviction. 
Courts will, as under the pre-Charter case of Smythe113 and as confirmed 
most recently by the Court in Nixon,114 be reluctant to review such 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion, and it will not be possible in most 
cases for accused to establish that an abuse of process has occurred. 
The Supreme Court ultimately will have to decide whether it wishes 
to maintain the level of judicial deference towards mandatory sentences 
seen in cases such as Morrisey.115 The government has rarely exceeded 
four years in its new mandatory sentences. Some, but not all, lower 
courts have interpreted Morrisey as a sign that they should be extremely 
deferential to mandatory sentences. The section 12 jurisprudence and the 
new section 7 proportionality principle briefly mentioned in Ipeelee116 
hinge on requirements that punishment be proportionate to crimes. There 
are resources in proportionality jurisprudence to focus not only on the 
abstract seriousness of the crime as measured by its mens rea, but on the 
particular circumstances of the offence and the offender. A seven-year 
mandatory penalty was struck down in Smith117 because of both the 
breadth of the importing narcotics offence and the fact that the offender 
the Court was concerned about was a young first-time offender. The facts 
in Smickle118 — a first-time offender who supported children and made a 
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stupid albeit criminal mistake — made all the difference to the court’s 
conclusion. Ipeelee points towards a richer and more contextual under-
standing of moral blameworthiness that makes room for consideration of 
how the particular characteristics and background of offenders may 
affect what is necessary to punish, deter and rehabilitate them. 
Despite this potential, proportionality analysis conducted under either 
section 7 or section 12 of the Charter could still be quite deferential to 
the new mandatory sentences, especially those that can be mitigated 
by the prosecutor’s discretion to elect to proceed under less punitive 
summary conviction procedures and those that are of a shorter duration. 
The Court could stick with the deference towards Parliament’s decision 
to use mandatory sentences seen in cases such as Morrisey and Latimer.119 
Although the Insite120 and Bedford121 cases produced Charter victories, it 
is far from clear that accused will be able to use those precedents to 
demonstrate that the new mandatory sentences are arbitrary or grossly 
disproportionate to the government’s legislative objectives in deterring 
and punishing crimes or controlling judicial discretion. It is possible that 
the Canadian criminal justice system could be made much more punitive, 
harsher and meaner without violating Charter norms. The Charter may 
not save us from ourselves and the governments we elect. The very real 
possibility that the Charter will achieve little in curbing the government’s 
crime agenda would confirm that judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion and mandatory sentences remains a weak spot in Charter 
jurisprudence. This prospect dampens my celebration of the 30th 
anniversary of the Charter. 
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